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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ALil'1E R. BENALLY and PERLIND~\ BEN ALLY, by her guardian ad litem, ALICE R. BEN ALLY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants~

vs.

Case 'r
..~._~ o.
9677

L. G. ROBINSON, CLIFFORD G.
ED~IUXDS and LOUIS
DUNCAN
' Defendants-Respondents.

''r·

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

'1'he statement of facts in the appellants' brief does
not set forth the eYidence in conflict with that relied
upon therein, although the fact of inconsistency is
admitted. }.,or this reason it is necessary that the respondent L. G. Robinson, who 'vas the only defendant
remaining in the case at the time of the trial, point out
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such inconsistencies and such other evidence as is pertinent to a decision by this court.
The plaintiffs' decedent, Thomas Dee Benally,
'vas arrested for public drunkenness by defendant Robinson on the evening of N oyember 26, 1960. It was
the testimony of the bartender and manager of the
Havana Club that Benally came into the HaYana Club
sometime after 5:00 P.l\1:. on the above mentioned
date and was escorted out of the premises by the witness
because he was drunk and had been fighting, the latter
conclusion arising from the fact that Benally had been
bleeding at the mouth. Once outside the building he
resumed fighting with other Indians and 'vas knocked
down on the sidewalk. He was described by the witness
as being "on the warpath" at that time. (R. 338-339).
He was subsequently taken into custody at the 73 Inn
where he was described by an employee as then haYing
a laceration on his nose and blood on his shirt. (R. 334).
His continued state of belligerence 'Yas attested by
his intentionally lurching back,Yards on the steps of
the jail and landing on top of Officer Robinson. (R.
112-114, 178-179) . ~...,ollo"'ing this occurrence Robinson
and Benally "'. ere admitted to the "booking area" of
the city jail.
At this point Robinson con1n1enced searching the
prisoner as he was required to do. It is clear from the
evidence that this procedure \Yas undertaken by Robinson directly in front of the booking " . indo". as shown
on Exhibits 5-P and 6-P. Such was the testitnony of
2
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James 0. l)ay (R. 31~>) and defendant Duncan, the
assistant jailer at the time. ( R. 378). 'Vhile being
searched Benally became Yery hostile and resisted the
efforts of Robinson to remove a ten dollar bill from
his watch pocket. (ll. 157, 304-305, 309, 386). Benally
then dropped down to the floor directly in front of the
booking window and Robinson placed his legs over
llenally and removed the ten dollar bill from the prisoner's pocket. (R. 157, 309, 386-389). After removing
the bill from Benally's pocket, Robinson testified that
he released Benally and turned to his left to place the
ten dollar bill on the counter in front of the booking
\vindow. (R. 157). Robinson also testified that he released Benally at the north edge of the booking window (R. 161) \vhich is forty-five inches south of the
entrance to the stairway down which Benally fell as
measured along the west side of the booking area; and
that Benally traveled backwards approximately 9 feet
6• inches from the place he was released to the point
he struck the wire gate. (Exhibit 6-P, R. 171-172,
175). Robinson's testimony is confirmed by that of the
jail inmate Day, \vho testified that Officer Robinson
\Vas facing the booking 'vindow when he had Benally
between his legs, that Benally had to travel 3 or 4.<
feet to the stairs after he pulled loose from Robinson
and that Robinson '\,·as back in toward me, and the
Indian "·as out t(nvard the front." (R. 314-315). 'fhis
is also consistent 'vith the testimony of Officer Duncan
that Robinson \vas directly in front of him at the booking \vindo'v \vhen he saw Benally back into the \vall
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and fall to his left down the stairway and that Benally
traveled some 5 or 6 feet back to the wall before he
fell down the stairs. (R. 379, 389). The evidence is
undisputed that a person could not fall down the stairway from the area in front of the booking window
because it is separated by a chain link wall from floor
to ceiling. (Exhibits 3-P and 5-P, R. 173-174). The
various locations attributed to Officer Robinson on
Exhibit 6-P are undoubtedly due to the fact that he
moved toward Benally in an attempt to catch him. (R.
305, 356, 363, 390, 175) . In this regard it should be
borne in mind that Officer Edmunds did not actually
observe the events until Benally had already gone half
way down the stairs ( R. 323-324, 328-329) , and that
the witness Betty Starks' first obserYation '"as at the
time that Benally hit the wire door and fell down the
stairs. (R. 355-360).
Insofar as appellants rely upon the testunony of
inmate James 0. Day to establish the fact that Robinson had a club in his hand 'vith which he allegedly struck
Benally upon the head \vhen he was astraddle the
prisoner, suffice it to say that this "ras absolutely denied
by Robinson ( R. 178, 365-366) ~ by Duncan ( R. 392) .
by Mrs. Starks ( R. 356) and the testin1ony of both
Dr. Swift and Dr. Lindstrom that there \vere no bruises
or external evidences of injury on the decedent's scalp
'vhich ,,·ould be expected if such blo,vs had actually
been adminstered. (R. 124-125, 127~ 136). In addition
there was evidenee that Robinson had a cigar in his
hands when he brought Bena.lly into the booking area.

4
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( R. a~8-349. :;~2). ,_fhe j urr's finding against the
appellants upon this point is clearly supported by the
evidence.
Day's further state1nent that he heard Edmunds
say to Robinson that he "'asn't going to accept prisoners
that \vere beat up and that said statement was made
before Benally fell down the stairs was refuted by
l)uncan, 'vho testified that he heard a remark to the
effect that anyone "·ho \vas injured would not be booked
and that this remark \\'as made after Benally had fallen
do,vn the stairs and been carried back to the booking
area. ( R. 391-397). Duncan also testified that he never
heard any re1nark to the effect that "Robby, if you
don't stop beating these fellows up, I am not going to
book them." (R. 391). Robinson also denied that any
statement such as, "Robinson, if you don't quit beating
these guys up I am going· to quit taking them," was
ever made by Edn1unds during the booking of Benally.
( R. 349-:3~30) . Actually Day admitted that it was not
too clear to him "Then the alleged staten1ent was made.
(R. 310). Again the jury's determination that there
"'aS no unreasonable use of force employed by Robinson
in this case is supported by the evidence .
.r\ppellants rely heavily upon the deposition of
'fhomas L. Casteel, 'vho had been booked in the city
jail for federal probation violation just prior to the
booking of l~enally, 'vhich deposition "Tas taken in
Evanston. ''Tyoming on November 8, 1961. In particular they lay rnuch "Teight upon the "Titness' testi-
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mony that ( 1) he observed a club in Robinson's hand
when the officer brought Benally into the booking area,
(2) he heard Edmunds say, ''Robinson, if you don't
quit beating these guys up I am going to quit taking
them" prior to Benally's fall down the stairs and (3)
that James Day, another inmate '"ho continued to
watch the booking of the prisoner, turned to Casteel
and said, "Robinson has knocked him down the steps."
The incredulous nature of this evidence, together with
its absolute inconsistency with the former testimony
of both Casteel and Day, must be pointed out.
In the first place, Casteel testified at the inquest
held in Salt Lake City on December 6, 1960, immediately following Benally's death and while he was
still an inmate of the city jail, that (a) he sa"~ Benally
for the first time \vhen the officers were carrying him
from the booking area into the cell block on the main
floor ( R. 342) , (b) he did not see Benally at any time
during the booking or "Then he "~as first brought into
the jail, but only heard the1n booking him ( R. 34-:t) ,
(c) they had brought Benally back up the stairs after
his fall \V hen Casteel first sa"~ hi1n ( R. 3~4) , and (d)
that he was three to ten feet to the right of the doorway
into the main floor cell block "~bile Benally "~as being
booked. (R. 345-346). 1\.s a natural consequence of
the foregoing testimony, Casteel neYer n1entioned anything at all about a club in Robinson's hand at the
inquest. Day's testimony at the inquest confirms that
of Casteel giYen in the sa1ne proceeding-. Day testified
that he was the only person \Vho sa"~ the club in Robin6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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son's hand (It. 30~3) but that Casteel did observe thetn
drag llenally into the cell block after he had fallen.
1\ t the ti1ne of his deposition, ho,vever, Casteel claimed
that he didn't haYe an opportunity to testify about the
club at the inquest (R. 241-242, 244) and then attempted to explain the total inconsistency between his
former testimony and that given in the subsequent
deposition relating to his observation of events leading
up to Benally's fall upon the basis that his answers
given at the inquest 'vere directed to the point in time
at \Yhich he was first able to make positive identification
of Benally "·ith relation to a picture of the decedent.
(R. 251-255). The absurdity of such an explanation
is apparent-it 'vouldn't matter at which point in the
continued observation of a series of events involving
a particular individual that the observer could make
positiYe identification of the individual with relation
to a photograph, for having once made such identification the precedent events involving that individual, as
'vell as those subsequent thereto, become an integral
"·hole for the purpose of "first" observation. This is
so clearly part and parcel of everyday experience that
it "·ould not seem to admit of doubt.
Secondly, the unreliable nature of Casteel's testimony given at the above mentioned deposition is irrefutably established hy his testimony that Day turned to
him and said ''Robinson has knocked him down the
steps." That this mental concoction 'vas blended from
the ingredients of pure fabrication is conclusively
proven by the testimony of Day himself given at the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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inquest and received in evidence below. Day testified
that Benally was not being cooperative when he \\~as
being searched and in the course of the struggle with
Officer Robinson he broke away off balance and fell
down the stairs. When asked if Robinso·n pushed
Benally or anything of that sort he answered_, "'"No_,
sir.-'-' (R. 309). The jury chose not to believe Casteel's
testimony-indeed, any other conclusion would have
been subject to serious doubt.
Finally, it should also be pointed out that Casteel
was, at the time of events involved in this la"'"Suit and
at the time of his deposition, on probation from the
United States District Court in Cheyenne, ''ryoming,
after having entered a plea of guilty to charges of
committing mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail
fraud. (R. 238-239, 257-258). His apparent bias
against Utah la'v enforcement officials 'vho picked him
up for probation violation is evident from his reluctance
to return to Utah on the ground that he didn't ""\\"an1
any part of Utah" or "anything to do with Utah" be .
cause of his sad experiences there. ( R. 257) .
''rith regard to the heayy 'vire Inesh door at the
head of the stairs do"~n "~hich Benally fell, it ""as the
undisputed evidence of Assistant C'hief of Police Steinfeldt, under 'vhose supervision the city jail ""as. and is,
operated, that Officer Robinson had no obligation as
part of his duty in booking Benally to check doors
and other facilities of the jail itself to determine
whether or not they were being maintained in accord-
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ance "·ith police departtnent directives. (R. 193, 196).
r1,hat responsibility "·as reposed in those directly in
charge of the jail facilities. (R. 192-193). Chief Steinfeldt testified that, prior to the time that the gate was
installed. the procedure was to book the prisoners and
then take then1 downstairs for detention in the course
of 'vhich some of the prisoners fell down the stairs,
"·hereas, subsequent to the installation of the gate, the
prisoners \Yere booked and placed in the main cell block
to avoid taking· them downstairs. (R. 184). It would
appear therefrom that the problem of prisoners falling
do,vn the stairs stemmed from the necessity of taking
the prisoners do"·n the stairway and not from the mere
fact that a stairway existed or that persons were falling
down the stairs otherwise than in the course of attempting to navigate the same. It ,,·as also Chief Steinfeldt's
testi1nony that he "·as a'vare that the gate at the head
of the stairs was held back in an open position to facilitate the feeding of prisoners and cleanup of the jail
by trusty prisoners and that he had seen such a practice
on several occasions. ( R. 193-194) . He further testified
that the booking officer was required to search prisoners
and remove valuables from their persons in the booking
area. ( R. 364 ) .
Robinson testified that the first time he noticed
the door "·as open at the head of the stairs "ras \\·hen
Benally "·ent through it. (R. 181). He also testified
that he had not taken his eyes off the prisoner during
the booking procedure. (R. 183). It should also be
noted that the opening of the door from the reception
9
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room to the booking area would, to a great degree,
obscure the arresting officer's vision of the stairway
and the position of the gate at the top thereof. (Exhibits 3-P, 4-P and 6-P). As a matter of fact, the
clarity of vision through successive panels of wire mesh
of the sort involved herein leaves much to be desired
and, in the absence of studied scrutiny, could not be
expected to leave vivid impressions with a casual observer. (See Exhibit 3- P) .

ARGUMEN'l'
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID XOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO SUBMI'l., THE CASE TO 'l'HE
JURY ON THE 'THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE.
First of all, the lower court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury upon the theory of negligence because there was no evidence in the record to support
such a finding against defendant Robinson. In order
that there may be actionable negligence, there must be
a duty or obligation on the part of the person charged
with negligence, and a breach of such duty. Industrial
Commission of Utah ·c. Jr,. asatch Grading Companzf,
80 U. 223, 14 P.2d 988; 38 Am. Jur.~ ~'egligence~ Sec.
12; 65 C.J.S.~ !\' egligence~ Sec. ~. The plaintiffs' theory
of negligence on the part of defendant Robinson is
based on (a) his failure to close the door at the head
of the stair"·ay, or (b) his failure to keep Benally
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under control h~r releasing hitn in the booking area
after retnoYing the $10 bill from his person. As to the
first claitn of negligence above noted, the evidence is
conclusive and undisputed that no duty existed on the
part of the defendant Robinson to maintain the jail
faeilities, including doors contained therein, in accordance \vith police department regulations. (R. 193, 196}.
As to the second claim of negligence relied upon
it is likewise undisputed that the force employed by
ll,obinson in restraining Benally immediately prior to
his fall \vas necessitated by the latter's failure to cooperate with the officer in having his person searched
and \Vas not precipitated by any hazard to the physical
safety of the prisoner. After removing the $10 bill
from the pocket of Benally as he was required to do, it
\vas only natural that Robinson would release Benally
from the physical restraint which the officer had by
necessity employed to discharge his duty in removing
all Yaluables from his person. Indeed, it is provided by
statute that, in making an arrest, " ( t) he defendant
must not be subjected to any more restraint than is
necessary." Section 77-13-2, Utah (lode Annotated
1953. It is clear in this case that it was no longer
necessary for the arresting ofl'icer to continue the
ph~rsical restraint of holding ]Jenally bet,veen his legs
for the purpose of removing the $10 bill fro1n hitn.
,.fhe need for the initial imposition of physical restraint
had exhausted itself. and it "rould be a most unjust
requirement to hold that the restraint employed by
Robinson for one purpose should haYe been continued
11
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for a completely unrelated purpose, particularly when
the evidence indicates that the officer was unaware of
circumstances which would require the latter. In addition to the evidence that Robinson had no duty or
obligation with respect to the door, the evidence undisputedly establishes that there 'vas no danger that
reasonably could have been foreseen by Robinson in
releasing Benally at the time he did for Benally was
on his hands and knees in front of the booking window
and that portion of the booking area was protected
from the stairs by a chain link wall from floor to ceiling.
It V{as further established that Robinson didn't even
know that the door at the head of the stairs was open
until Benally went through it because his attention
had been entirely devoted to his prisoner.
This court has ruled that, in determining whether
conduct meets the standard of care for the ordinary
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, the test is to be applied on the basis of foresight
and not of hindsight. Lazcrence v. Ba1nberger Railroad
Co1npany~ 3 U.2d 247, 282 P.2d 335.
See also The
Ger11zanic~ 196 U.S. 589 49 L. Ed. 610, 25 S.Ct. 317.
In this connection, it has been held by this court that
reasonable foreseeability of dang'er or risk of harm
to another is an essential element in the proof of negligent conduct. HilllJard v. lltah BlJ-Products Co., I
U.2d 143, 263 P.2d 287. See also Annotation 155
'
A.L.R. 157. Further1nore, the doctrine is elementary
that in cases 'Yhere the maxim of res ipsa loquitur does
not apply negligence ·malJ not be prcsu1n ed or inferred
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l!lcrely because an accident occurred. (J_uiiln v. Utah
Gas & ( 'okc (}o., 4~ lT. IIH~ 129 P. 362, 43 L.R.r\.
(X.S.) a:.!8. r\nd the failure to guard against a bare
possibility of accident is not actionable negligence.
1

BradlJ 1\ Southern Rail7.ca.tJ ( ornpany~ 320 U.S. 476,
88 L.Ed. ~:39, 64 S. Ct. 232. It is also stated in 38
..JnL Jur., 1.\Tegliycncc, Sec. 2~, p. 670, that "the duty

to use due care arises from probabilities, rather than
fro1n bare possibilities, of danger." In applying the
above rules to the facts and circumstances of the present
ease~ it is clear that the foreseeability or probability
of injury occurring to Benally was too remote at the
time and place he \\'as released from physical restraint
by Robinson to submit to the jury on the theory of
negligence. 'ro permit a jury to consider negligence as
a basis of recovery under the facts and circumstances
of this case would be to permit the jury to speculate.
This they may not do. Olsen v. Warwood~ 123 U. Ill,
255 P.2d 725, and cases therein cited. The accidental
nature of Benally's fall down the stairs was graphically
revealed by the jail inmate James 0. Day, who testified that it surprised Robinson as much as it did the
Indian. ( R. 305) .
'l"he plaintiffs' second theory of negligence, i.e.,
the failure of Robinson to keep Benally under physical
control, is also inseparably connected "'ith their first
claim of negligence relating to the failure to close the
door at the head of the stairs, for the accident would
not haYe occurred under either circumstances had the
door been closed. r\.s 've have seen there "'as no duty
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on Robinson's part to keep that door closed. It 'vould
follow therefrom that liability should not be predicated
upon the second theory of negligence in the absence
of actual knowledge by Robinson that the door was
open for, as was said in Chiuchiolo v. New England
Wholesale Tailors~ 84 N.H. 329, 150 A.540, 544, one
is not required to anticipate against dangers which it
is not his duty to avoid. There is no evidence in the
record to sustain the fact that Robinson actually
observed that the door was open prior to the time that
Benally fell through it. In view of the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that the lower court did not err in
failing to instruct the jury upon negligence in this case.
Even if this court should find that the record in
this case does contain evidence of negligence on the
part of Officer Robinson, it must affirm the verdict
and judgment of the lower court on the ground that
such evidence consists solely of acts of omission or
nonfeasance in the performance of governmental duties
for 'vhich a police officer is exonerated from liability.
Likewise, the sumn1ary judgment entered in favor of
defendants-respondents Edmunds and Duncan must
be affirmed for the sa1ne reason.
In the case of Mo.lJnihan t'. Todd~ 188 ~lass. 301,
108 Am. St. Rep. J73, 74 N.E. 367, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted the rule (both
English and American) to the following effect:
"It has al"~ays been held in the Atnerican
courts that an agency of gover1unent or a public
14
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ofl'icer, \\·bile perforrning a duty imposed solely
for the benefit of the public, is not liable for a
1nere failure to <lo that which is required by the
statute. X egligencc that is nothing rnore than
on1ission or nonfeasance creates no liability."
( l~ iting many cases.)
'fhe court then applied the rule to the facts of the case
and concluded as follows:

'' Jfr e are of the opinion that the principle "lchich
underlies the rule that public officers and other
agencies o.f government are not liable for ncglir;cnce in the performance of public duties yoes
no further than to relive them from liability for
nonfeasance and for the misfeasance of their
scr7..'rt nts or agentt~. For a personal act of misfeasance "re are of opinion that a party should
be held liable to one injured by it as well when
in the performance of a public duty as when
otherwise engaged." (Emphasis added) .
In the later case of Trum v. Town of Paxton, 329
)lass. ·~HJ~ 109 N.E. 2d 116, the Massachusetts court
again conf-lrn1ed the holding in 111O/J nihan v. Todd and
held that a public officer, "-hile performing his duties
imposed solely for the benefit of the public, is not liable
for a mere failure to do that which is required by
statute~ and his negligence which amounts to nothing
. . ~~
f
1·
1nore t han an omission
~ non easance, creates no lability. The court further held that "nonfeasance" is
the omission of an act 'vhich a person ought to do, and
"misfeasance" i5 the improper doing of an act 'vhich
a person might la,vfully do.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah expressly
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adopted the ruling of the Mo/jnilzan case in Lowry v.
Carbon Co1.tnty et al.~ 64 U. 555, 232 P. 908, decided
in 1924. The facts of the two cases were very similar
involving injuries sustained as a result of road blasting
operations. The Utah court adopted the holding of the
Massachusetts court in a distinct and all-inclusive manner as follows at pages 910-911 of 232 Pacific Reporter:
"Here there is charged an active personal participation in the doing of a lawful thing in a negligent manner. The case of Moynihan v. Todd~
188 Mass. 301, 74 N.E. 367, 108 Am. St. Rep.
473, in our judgment, announces the correct
principle applicable to the case here presented
upon the pleadings.

"***
''The (Massachusetts) court thus proceeds to
announce the rule generally applicable to public
officers, as follows:
" 'Follo,ving this rule, it al"~ays has been held
in the American courts that an agency of government or a public officer, 'vhile performing a
duty imposed solely for the benefit of the public,
is not liable for a 1nere failure to do that which
is required by the statute. Negligence that is
nothing more than an on1ission or nonfeasance
creates no liability.'
"After citing numerous authorities in support
of this doctrine, the l\Inssachusetts court proceeds, as follows:

'''r
e are. of the opinion that the principle
'vlnch underhes the rule that public officers and
'~

other agencies of govern1nent are not liable for
negligence in the perfor1nance of public duties
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goes no further than to relieve them from liability for nonfeasance, and for the 1nisfeasance
of their servants and agents. For a personal act
of misfeasance, we are of the opinion that a
party should be held liable to one injured by it,
as \vell "·hen in the performance of a public duty
as \vhen otherwise engaged, * * * But for acts
of misfeasance of a servant or agent in such
cases, there is no liability. This is because the
rule respondeat superior does not apply. * * *
rrhe result is that, if the jury in the present
case find that the defendant was personally negligent in causing the rock to be blasted 'vithout
taking proper precaution for the safety of persons rightfully in the vicinity, a verdict should
be rendered against him, but if there was no negligence in blasting the rock, or if the only negligence was that of the defendants' servants or
agents, he is not liable.'
"Having approved of the doctrine announced
by the Massachusetts court in the last-mentioned
case, it necessarily follows that the lower court
was in error in sustaining the demurrer as to the
defendants county commissioners, in view of the
allegations of the complaint that said defendants, and each of them, were 'actually engaged'
in the performance of the work complained of,
and that the defendants, and all of them, 'carelessly and negligently participated in the act
complained of.' "
It is clear, therefore, that the Lo'lory case is uncontroverted authority for the proposition that a public
officer is liable only for negligent acts of commission
constituting misfeasance in the discharge of his governmental duties and is not liable for acts of nonfeas-
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ance. The subsequent case of Roe 1,. Lundstrom_, 89 L:.
520, 57 P.2d 1128, affirmed the ruling in Lowry by
holding as follow~::
"It is a general rule that a municip~l offic~r
is immune from liability in a private s~It ~or h1s
acts in the discharge of corporate duties In the
absence of willful negligence_, malic~,. or corruption, constituting misfeasance."" (Citing cases.)
(Emphasis added.)
By the use of the term '\villful negligence * * *
constituting Inisfeasance" the court has clearly recognized the difference between acts of omission for
which the law will exonerate a public officer from liability in the performance of his governmental duties
and acts of commission for which he will be answerable
in damages to one injured thereby. It thus follo"\\rs
that, in order to sustain a claim for damages against
police officers arising out of the performance of their
prescribed duties, the clai1nant 1nust show something
more than nonfeasance or the failure of the officer to
do an act which he should haYe done. As stated by our
Supreme Court that something Inore n1ust a1nount to
an act of "'illful negligence, or as other,vise stated,
misfeasance.
In the case of Rozclcy 'll. ("edar Ra]Jids. ~03 lo,va
1245, 212 N.l,r. 158~ 53 A.L.R. 375~ the court cited
and sustained the rule of the 111O/Jilihan case. and affirmed the holding in previous lo\\·a cases that an aaent
b
"·ho performs a governn1ental functio11 on behalf of
a county is no 1nore responsible for 11egligence in so
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doing than the corporation for \vhich he acts, but did
so on the basis that in such cases the acts charged as
negligence 'vere acts of nonfeasance relating to the
condition of highways and acts on1itted in preparing
the same for use.
'l'he court also cited the case of Wood t'. Boone
County, 153 Iowa 92,133 N.\,r. 377,39 L.R.A. (N.S.)
168, Ann. Cases 1913 D. 1070, wherein the act complained of 'vas one of nonfeasance, the failure to furnish relief to a pauper, in which the municipal officer
\vas held immune from liability. Thus the court recognized the "well-recognized distinction between acts of
nonfeasance, and those of misfeasance'' and held that
a public officer is personally liable for acts of misfeasance while he is engaged in the performance of
governmental duties.
Again in Smith v. Iotca City~ 213 Io"·a 391, 239
29, 31, the court pointed out the difference between acts constituting nonfeasance, such as the failure
of city officers to maintain park equipment in repair
and in a safe condition for the use of the public, and
acts of commission constituting misfeasance, and concluded that city officers 'votdd not be individually liable
for acts of nonfeasance as above stated.

N.,,r.

But in the case of Hibhs t'. IndetJendent School
District, 218 Io,,·a 841, 251 :N
606, the court made
no distinction between acts of misfeasance and acts of
nonfeasance and held that exemption from liability

·''r·
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extended to municipal officers for all their negligent
acts.
In overruling the Hibbs case, insofar as it exempted
municipal officers from personal liability for their negligent acts of misfeasance, it was stated in Montanick
v. McMillan~ 225 Iowa 442, 280 N.
608, as follows:

' T.

"In the case of Hibbs v. Independent School
District~ * * * this court made no distinction
between acts of misfeasance and acts of nonfeasance. However, it is interesting to note that
the cases cited and relied upon in the Hibbs case
are all cases of nonfeasance and there is not a
single case cited that holds the agent or employee is not liable for an act of misfeasance.
* * * Nowhere, except in the Hibbs case, do "ye
find that the agent or employee himself, "yhen
sued as an individual, rather than in his official
capacity, is not liable for acts of misfeasance,
that is, a positiYe negligent act 'vhich caused injury and damage to another.''
The court then rea.ffirn1ed the holdings of Jloynihan~
Rowley and Smith, and concluded as follo,vs:
"An act of misfeasance is a positive "yrong,
and every employee, "yhether e1nployed by a
private person or n 1nunicipal corporation, o"~es
a duty not to injure another by a negligent act
of com1nistYion. It is the breach of this dutv 'vhich
the la"r i1nposes on nil Inen that is inYolv.ed, and
this general obli,qation to injure no nzan bij an
act of 11zisfeasance is neither increased nor tdinz ..
inishcd b.tJ the .fact th~1~ the negligent parflJ is
an clnplo.tJCe of a 1nunu·zpal corporation.n (En1..
phasis added) .
20
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'fhe rule laid down in the 1ll ontanick case, that an
e1nployee of a 1nunicipality is liable for an act of misfeasance on his part, notwithstanding the fact that he
is engaged in the performance of a governmental func·
tion, \\·as expresslr adopted and reaffir1ned in Shirkey
v. [(cokuk ( ounty, 225 Iowa 1159, 281 N.W. 837.
1

To the same effect is the case of Milstrey v. City of
Hackensack. 6 N.J. 400, 79 A.2d 37, wherein the court
cited 1lloynihan v. Todd~ Florio v. Jersey City~ 101
X .J .L. 535, 129 A. 470, 40 A.L.R. 1353 and 37 -L1 m,.
J ur. 887, and declared the rule as follows:
"Municipal officers are not liable for damage
resulting from mere passive nonfeasance, unless
the liability arises by statute, but they are liable
for damage resulting from their active misfeasance in performance of their public works.\'
And in the case of I~arson v. Yuma County~ 26
I\_riz. 367, 225 P. 1115, the court held that neither a
county nor its officers are liable for the death of one
killed when his automobile ran off a highway bridge
" . hich had been negligently Inaintained without a guard
railing, such maintenance being a governmental function.
In an annotation in 60 A.L.R. 2d 873, at page
879, it is stated that " (a) peace officer, as a general
rule, is personally liable for negligent or wrongful
acts causing personal injury or death" and is supported
by numerous authorities. In checking a random selection of cited cases from Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, ~Iaryland,
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~Iichigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, X e,,. Hampshire,
New Jersey, N e'v Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, \\T ashington, ''Tisconsin and
\Vyoming, only one case was found which did not involve an act of commission, or misfeasance, upon the
part of the public officer for which recovery was being
sought and allowed by the courts. All the other cases
involved injuries sustained by reason of shooting, assault and battery, automobile collision, etc. The single
exception was the case of Dunham v. Village of Canisteo~ 303 N.Y. 498, 104 :\T.E. 2d 872, "·herein the
Court of Appeals of New York held that, u:here the
officers assu1ned charge of a 76 year old man "·ho "·as
found lying on the floor of the fire station, muttering
incoherently and apparently suffering from cold and
pain, such officials were under an obligation to exercise
ordinary care, including procurement of Inedical assistance, if they knew or should haYe kno"·n that the man
"·as hurt or injured and in need of a doctor. After confinement in jail for 18 hours, not as a result of arrest
for violating anlJ lu'ti) or ordinance but to keep hinz
warm~ he was prov-ided medical care but subsequently
succumbed from pnetnnonia. It "·ill be noted that this
case did not involYe the exercise of goyerm11ental duties
by said officers but did involv-e a duty to exercise ordinary care after they had asstn11ed charge of caring for
the deceased. }..,urthermore, the court especially noted
that municipal corporations no longer enjoyed soverelgn iininunity in N e"· \...-ork State.
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In any eYent the ruling in the Dnnham case was
rendered ineffective hy the Ia ter decision of the Court
of r\ppeals of N e\\' York in Bernard v. Village of
.A·lndover, (1960) 7 N.Y. 2d 1050, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 437,
"·hich held that police officers 'vere not under a duty
to secure medical treatment for decedent whose bladder
had been ruptured as a result of a fight in a bar, where
the officers directed his removal from the street by
persons 'vho volunteered to take him home and the
officers thereafter called upon him at his dwelling to
quiet him after receiving complaints from neighbors
that his moaning and groaning was disturbing the
peace.
A close examination of the cases cited in appellants' brief indicates that they involve acts of misfeasance or, as pointed out in Milstrey v. City of Hackensack~ supra~ liability arises by statute creating affirmative duties. Thus, in Clark v. l(elly, 101 W. Va. 650,
133 S.E. 365, 46 A.L.R. 799, the holding of the court
was based upon a statute and city ordinance setting
forth the affirmative duties of a jailor and the facts also
involved the element of 'villful wrongdoing by the
officer in placing the plaintiff in a flooded jail cell. In
Hunt v. Rowton~ 143 Okla. 181, 288 P. 342, the case
turned on a specific statutory requirement that the
sheriff isolate prisoners 'vith contagious diseases. In
Bukaty t\ Berglund~ 179 Kan. 259, 294 P.2d 228, the
action involved the use of sulphur dioxide gas to subdue
a jail inmate, resulting in his death, and the issue in
that case 'vas not negligence but whether or not there
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had been an unnecessary use of force. Insofar as the
Kansas Court refers to negligence in the foregoing decision, it must have application solely to the facts
therein recited which clearly constitute an act of commission or misfeasance. In Thornas v. Williams (Ga.
1962) 124 S.E. 2d 409, acts of misfeasance, such as
the pouring of \Vater on burning mattresses thereby
increasing the smoke hazard and defendant's affirmative action in refusing to permit others to remove the
prisoner from the smoke-filled jail, were clearly called
into issue in the court's decision. In addition to the
foregoing the case of .Justice v. Rose~ 102 Ohio App.
482, 144 N.E. 2d 303, actually held opposite to the
claim of the appellants. The court in that case stated
that " ( i) n all the cases where liability of the officer
has been sustained for injuries inflicted by another
prisoner the facts show a zcillful and h_~nou.:n neglect
* * * '' and then concluded that such a showing had not
been made and therefore sustained the lo,ver court's
demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. (Emphasis ours).
The appellants also cite the Utah case of Richardson v. Capwell~ 63 U. 616~ 176 P. 205, in support of
their position. It is clear that the court~s determination
that the plaintiff "·as entitled to have his damages
determined "·ith respect to the defendant's failure to
furnish food for jail prisoners and to keep the jail '"arn1
and sanitary "·as purely Yoluntary and gratuitously
offered by the court outside the issue presented in the
appeal. It is also apparent that such acts as \vere there
in ,·olved derive from a known affirinatiYe duty the
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breach of "·hieh partakes of a zcillful disregard for the
rights of others.
Insofar as the defendant-respondent Robinson is
concerned, his claimed acts of negligence consisted
n1erely of acts of o1nission or nonfeasance unaccompanied br any aspect of willfulness in the performance
of his official duties and, therefore, the judgment of
the lower court should be affirmed even if such claimed
acts are held by this court to be sufficient evidence of
negligence to otherwise warrant submission to a jury.
It also follows, as a matter of law, that the complaint, as it is supported by the contentions of the
plaintiffs-appellants, was properly dismissed by the
lower court as to defendants-respondents Edmunds
and Duncan for the reason that no act of misfeasance
or \Yillful misconduct upon their part is alleged or
claimed by said plaintiffs-appellants. The only acts
complained of by them insofar as these two defendantsrespondents are concerned, are acts of omission (i.e.,
failure to close the wire door at the head of the stairs,
failure to assist Robinson in booking the decedent,
and failure to do such other acts as would have prevented the decedent from falling down the stairs),
unaccompanied by any allegation of "·illfulness. for
"·hich said defendants-respondents cannot be held personally responsible in an action for datnages by the
survivors of the decedent.
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POIN'f II

THE TRIAL COUR'l, DID N0,-1~ ERR IK
ADMITTING 'THE 'l,ES'l,MONY 0~~ THE DEFENDANT LOl;Is
DUNCAN ''rHICH
HAD BEEN GI,TEN PRE,TIOLTSLY 1\'l., ,-l.,HE
CORONER'S INQUEST.

''r·

Shortly before the date set for trial in the lower
court, the defendant-respondent Louis "\V. Duncan,
who had previously been dismissed as a defendant in
the lawsuit, was seriously injured in the performance
of his duties as a jailer at the city jail and was hospitalized at the St. :\larks Hospital as a result of said
injuries. A subpoena 'Yas issued by the defendant Robinson for the appearance of Duncan as a witness on
Robinson's behalf at the trial but "'"as returned unserved by the process server because of Duncan's
hospitalization. During the course of the trial it "'"as
ascertained by the court to its satisfaction that the
medical condition of Duncan "'"as such that it "'"ould not
pern1it of his removal fro1n the hospital for the purpose
of testifying in the trial on Robinson's behalf. The
court thereupon per1nitted the testimony of )Ir. Duncan which ",.as giYen at an inquest into the death of
'l.,homas D. Benally held before C'ity Judge Arthur
,J. Mays in Salt Lake C'ity, on Decen1ber 6-7, 1960,
and reported by lla (~. Ste"'"art. one of the official court
reporters of the 'J~hird District Court, to be read into
evidence in this case.
'fhe appellants object to the use of such eYidence
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on the ground that they have been deprived of their
right to cross examine the witness with respect to
statetnents he is alleged to have made to one Mr. Gregory for the purpose of a polygraph examination subsequent to the inquest. 'I'he appellants were free to
call :\Ir. Gregory as a witness to testify as to his knowledge in this matter but did not do so.
At the time of the inquest, counsel for appellants
\\·as present during all of the proceedings and had the
opportunity to cross exan1ine all the witnesses who
testified. (R. 253-254). Mr. Hanni claims that he represented the Navajo Tribe at that time and not Mrs.
Benally. (R. 371).
Inasmuch as the lower court relied heavily upon
the recent work of Professor Charles T. McCormick
(Professor of Law, University of Texas) on the Law
of Evidence in admitting the former testimony of Mr.
Duncan given at the inquest, it would appear advisable
to revie'v the more pertinent portions of that work as
contained in Chapter 26 thereof.
'l'he appellants attack the admissibility of the
former testimony of l\Ir. Duncan primarily on their
claimed denial of the right to cross examine the witness.
Indeed this i1nportant right is the basis for the historical
require1nents of "identity of parties" and "identity of
issues" in adn1itting former testi1nony, and we refer
the court to the 1nodern rules espoused by ~icCormick,
and supported by court decisions and other authorities.
''rith respect to the requirement of "identity of par-
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ties" it is stated as follows at page 489 of McCormick
on Evidence:
"Moreover under what seems the practical
and expedien't view, if the party against whom
the former testimony is now offered though not
a party to the former suit, nor in 'privit~' as a
successor in interest of any party therein, yet
actually cross-examined the witness (personally
or by counsel) about the matters "Thich he would
now want to cross-examine about, or \\. .as actually accorded a fair opportunity for such crossexanlination and had a like motive for such
exa1nination, then the former testimony may be
received. Finally, the natural next step is to
recognize, as progressive courts have done, that
neither identity of parties nor privity bet,veen
parties is essential. These are merely means to
an end. Consequently~ if it appears that in the
former suit a party having a like motive to crossexamine about the same matters as the present
party would have~ was accorded an adequate
O]Jportunity for s1tch exantination~ the testimony
may be received against the present party. Identity of interest, in the sense of motive, rather
than technical identity of cause of action or title~
is the test.n (Emphasis added).
And as to the require1nent of "identit~,. of issues" it is
stated thusly at page ~91 of JicCor1nick's treatise:
"l\Iust the forn1 of the proceeding~ the theory
of the case~ or the nature of the relief sought
be (the) same ? Though there have been occasional holdings i1nposing such requiren1ents, it
is 1nanifest that the~'" have no pertinence to the
poliey- of adequacy of opportunity for crossexainination and the Inore convincing· opinions
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reject the1n. * * * It seems, then, that the requirenlent should be restated, not as one of
identity or even of substantial identity of issues,
but merely· as a requirement that the issues in
the first proceeding and hence the purpose for
,\·hich the testimony was there offered must have
been such that the present opponent (or some
person in like interest) had an adequate motive
for testing on cross-examination the credibility
of the testimony now offered."
In an annotation in 70 A.L.R .. 2d 1179, 1181, it is stated
as follo"rs with a1nple supporting authority:
"'In a 1naj ority of the jurisdictions in which
the courts have considered the question of the
admissibility of testimony given in a criminal
action in a subsequent civil proceeding, where
the 'vitness who testified is no longer available,
the forn1er testimony has been held admissible
provided the person (or someone whose interests
'vere the same) against whom the evidence is
offered had the right of cross-examining the
'vitness at the time he gave the testimony, and
proYided also that the court determines the
parties and issues involved in both cases are
substantially the same."
And, likewise, Professor 'Vigmore in Sec. 1388 of his
monumental work on EYidence, 3rd Edition, concludes
as follows:
'·It ought, then to be sufficient to inquire
1.chether the former testimony was given upon
such an issue that the party opponent in that
case had the san~c interest and motive in his crosse(ranzinatio1t that the present opponent has_; and
the determination of this ought to be left entirely
to the trial judge.'' (Emphasis not added).

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In an annotation in 142 1\.L.R. at pages 696-700, a
long list of cases supporting the above doctrine of
Professor Wig1nore is set forth. An excellent recent
case upon the point in issue herein was Travelers Fire
Insurance Co. v. Wright~ (Okla. 1958) ~ 322 P.2d 417,
70 A.L.R. 2d 1170, affirming the above rule stated by
Wigmore, wherein the court held that "identity of
issues" is to be determined bv considering the "issue"
as that issue sought to be established by the witness
'vhen he testified in the criminal case as "'"eighed
against the issue sought to be proved by the witness
in the subsequent civil case. The court then concluded
as follows at page 1176 of 70 A.L.R. 2d:
~

"As a general proposition '"e think testimony
from a criminal case can be introduced in a subsequent ciYil case where it appears that it is impossible to obtain the testimony of the witness
who testified in the criminal case; that there 'Yas
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness by
the party against "·hom the testimony is sought
to be used in the ciYil case, or by one "'"hose motiYe and interest in cross-examining 'Yas the
same; and that there is an identity of issues."
It is clear fro1n the authorities upon the subject
that the underlying criterion for admissibility of prior
testin1ony is the require1nent that there haYe been full
opportunity for cross-exan1ina tion by the party against
"·ho1n the eYidence is subsequently
. offered or bv. sotne
one "·hose interests "-ere the s:une as that party. In this
regard it cannot be disputed that the X aYajo 'I'ribe
certainly had the same interest at the inquest into the
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death of 'rhotnas D. l~enally as do the plaintiffs-appellants in this case, namely, the determination of whether
or not that death \\'as brought about by the wrongful
nets or conduct of the police officers who are respondents herein. l\lr. Hanni admittedly represented the
"Navajo 1.,ribe at said inquest and fully cross-examined
Jlr. IJu ncan u,zJon the very point in issue relating to
the substance and tirne of the comment made by Officer
Ednnnzds pertaining to the booking of injured prisoners~ as well as upon all other aspects of Duncan's
testimony. ( R. 368-369, 382~ 383, 386, 389-390, 394,
395-398). The largest part of Duncan's testimony at
the inquest was, in fact, elicited upon cross-examinatio11
by Mr. Hanni.
'l.,he cases cited by appellants relating to the admissibility of former testimony given at a coroner's
inquest are clearly inapplicable in the present case for
the reason that the absolute requirement of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses therein involved
had not been accorded to the parties against whon1
such evidence "'as being subsequently offered or t{_)
some person 'vhose interests and motives were substantially the same. Respondents can11ot but agree with the
holdings in those cases under the facts peculiar to those
cases. Certainly if ~Ir. Hanni had not been present at
the inquest on behalf of the Navajo Tribe and there
had been no cross-examination by other persons whose
interests or motives in cross-examining Duncan would
have been the san1e as the survivors of the decedent.
then in that event such evidence 'vould clearly have
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been inadmissible in this action. This is the extent of
the holdings cited in appellants' brief. BUT under the
facts of this case, unusual though they may be, the
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Duncan was not
only accorded Mr. Hanni at the inquest but was seized
upon by him with unusual vigor in light of his claim
that such cross-examination was a matter of "grace"
and thereby inhibited his adversary potential.
With respect to the character of the tribunal and
the proceeding in which the former testimony was taken,
we again quote McCormick, supra, at page 496, as
follows:
"If the accepted requirements of the administration of the oath, adequate opportunity to
cross-examine on substantially the same issue
and present unavailability of the 'vitness, are
satisfied then the character of the tribunal
whether judicial, legislative, or administrative,
and the form of the proceedings are immateriat
and the former testimony should be received."
Citing Wigmore on Er·idc·nce, Sees. 1373, 1374.
Thus, where the right of cross-examination 'vas granted
at a coroner's hearing, the testimony there delivered
has been held adtnissible in a subsequent action. JJ elJers
v. State~ 33 Tex. Cr. 204, :!6 S.\,r. 196. And in a case
involving testitnony before arbitrators, Bailey t\ Jfl. oods,
17 N .I-I. 365, 373 ( 1845), the court held as follo"Ts:
"It does not see1n. to be an objection to the
con1petency of the evidence of the deceased witness~ that it "·as given at a hearing before arbitrators. \\r e do not understand that the adnlissi-
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bility of such evidence depends so much upon
the particular character of the tribunal, as upon
other tnatters. If the testimony be given under
oath in a judicial proceeding, in which the ad,·erse litigant 'vas a party, and where he had the
power to cross-exa1nine, and was legally called
upon to do so, the great and ordinary tests of
truth being no longer wanting, the testimony
so given is admitted in any subsequent suit bet,veen the parties."
In the end analysis the question of the admissibility
of the testimony giYen by Duncan at the inquest rests
upon the safeguards to its credibility. It was given
under oath before a judicial officer and reported and
transcribed by an official court reporter of the Third
Judicial District. Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants
was. present and was given every opportunity to crossexamine the witness on any aspect of the death of Mr.
Benally, which he did. The source of the claimed inconsistent statements alleged to have been made subsequent thereto is certainly not as well safeguarded and
the inclusion of Jlr. Gregory's statement in appellants,
brief should be entirely ignored as it in nowise was
received in evidence by the lower court. The failure
of the appellants to secure the testimony of Mr. Gregory for the benefit of the lower court cannot, and should
not, now be the basis upon which to invalidate the
admission of :\Ir. Duncan's previous testimony as evidence by the trial court. If claimed inconsistent statements allegedly made subsequent to previously sworn
testimony by a presently unavailable witness could
render such previous testimony inadmissible in the
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present proceeding, the "\veil-established rule permitting
such evidence would be rendered a nullity.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COUR'l., DID NOT ERR IN
GI'·TING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 21, 22 AXD 23.
Appellants object to Instruction No. 22 apparently
upon the assumption that Officer Robinson became an
insurer of the decedent after observing his intoxicated
condition and taking him into custody. '"fhis is not the
law. The case was submitted to the jury upon the
question of whether or not Robinson "\vas guilty oi
wrongful performance of duty by the use of unreason·
able force. In determining that question the jury was
correctly instructed that if Benally's fall resulted from
his own voluntary actions and intoxication there was
no breach of duty by the use of unreasonable force on
the part of Robinson. It is undoubtedly the la"? that
one 'vho has voluntarilY
.. disabled himself by
.. reason of
intoxication is held to the same degree of care and
prudence in the interest of his own safety that is required of a sober person. 38 A1n. Jur.~ ).Tegligencc,
Sees. 36, 203. Intoxication does not relieve a man from
the degree of care required of a sober n1a11 in the sa1ne
circtunstances. Vizacchcro t'. Rhode Island Co.~ 26 R.I.
392, 59 .1\. 105, 69 L.R.A. 188. It "'"as also held in
Pratt 'l\ O~I-la1·a. 135 l\Ie. 123, 190 A. 622, that one
who undertakes to see an intoxicated person ho1ne does
not becotne an insurer of his safe arriYal. Under the
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circumstanees of this case, it \vas proper for the court
to delineate to the jury the acts which "rould, and would
not, sustain a verdict against Robinson for the use of
unreasonable force against the decedent. Clearly, the
voluntary actions of the decedent including his state
of intoxication, if such actions caused his fall down
the stairs could not be the basis upon which the jury
could find an excessive use of force by the arresting
officer. Insofar as the issue of Robinson's negligence
is raised by appellants with respect to the giving of
this instruction the court is directed to respondents' preceding argument under Points I and II .
.1\ppellants also object to the giving of Instructions
~1 and 23 upon the ground that such instructions preclude the jury from rendering a verdict upon the
grounds of negligence. Respondents incorporate herein
the argument set forth under Points I and II hereinabove in answer to that contention.

CONCLUSION
'fhe lo,ver court properly excluded the issue of
negligence from detern1ination by the jury for the
reason that there was no evidence of negligence on the
part of defendant-respondent Robinson and the judgInent and verdict of the lower court should be affirmed.
,.,rith respect to the appellants' position that police
officers should be held responsible for negligent acts
of omission (nonfeasance) as well as negligent acts
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of commission (misfeasance) in the performance of
governmental duties it is clear that the courts have
not seen fit to so extend the realm of liability. Police
officers, in the performance of duties for which there
is no liability on behalf of their employers, are properly
immunized from liability for mere acts of omission or
nonfeasance except in cases of affirmative duties
created by statute. 'The lower court, therefore, was
correct in gra11ting summary judgment to the defendants-respondents Edmunds and Duncan and that
judgment should be affirmed by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
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